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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
H< fY v' .. rrYGEHEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
Number9681 
~l1\U~ .. \ \VATER COMPANY, 
..:\n l1nprovement District, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
ST·ATEMENT OF l(IND OF CASE 
T:his is a case where Defendant assessed charges for 
se\ver service, that Plaintiff contends are discriminatory. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants filed motion for sununary Judgement 
and Judge Ste"\vart ~f. Hanson denied Defendant's mo-
tion. Subsequently at a pre-trial Judge Ray 'Tan Cott, 
Jr. granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
S·TATEl\llENT OF FACT 
In 1941 the people of Magna, Utah, constructed and 
paid for a se,ver system to serve the town, then consisting 
of approxilnately 1,000 homes, \vhich 'vill be referred to 
hereafter as the old town. This sewer system ".,.as then 
turned over to Salt Lake County who have since operated 
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2 
the se\ver system to serve the old town, up to January 
1, 1961, \\.,hen the same was sold to the Defendant for 
$10.00. The Defendant has since that date operated the 
old se\ver system. 
Over the years, since 1941, the area immediately east 
of the old town developed by subdivision and otherwise 
to a point that there are no\\T approximately the sa1ne 
nun1ber of homes as 'vere in the old town (1,200). 
These new homes could not hook onto the old se,\·er 
system because the disposal plant had reached its capa-
city, and Salt Lake County refused permission to hook 
onto the old system. They relied on septic tanks. The 
Board of health considered the matter a health hazard. 
After a number of public meetings the people of the 
com1nunity persuaded the Defendant to expand its acti-
vities from its original purpose and activity as a water 
company serving the area, the old town and the new area, 
to expand its activities to include sewer service for the 
old and new area. 
A bond election was called and a $1,200,000.00 bond 
issue was authorized. The purpose to construct a new 
disposal unit, and construct sewer lines covering the en-
tire new area. No monies 'vere to be spent on new lines 
for the old town. The only benefit realized by residents 
on the old sewer system ".,as that their sewage would be 
transferred from the old obsolete disposal plant to the 
new one. No other benefits 'veTe, or are now furnished 
residents on the old systen1. The disposal plant cost ap-
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proxitnately $-!00,000.00. All the rest of the bond issue 
"·n~ used for lines in the UP\\. area. 
l>rior to the Defendant obtaining the old sewer sys-
tein, January 1, 1961, and on Decernber 20, 1960, Defend-
ant adopted a resolution as to rates and charges, requir-
ing all those on the old system to pay $3.00 p·er rnonth 
service charges. No charges were made against the 
people in the new area. 
The expense of operating the old system was never 
in excess of $500.00 per n1onth, or less than fifty cents 
per ho1ne. The $3.00 per month charge resulted in those 
in the old system paying 50 cents or less for actual serv-
iees rendered and paying $2.50 per month, or more, to pay 
for the sewer sy8tem for the new part of the town. Dur-
ing the period from January 1, 1961 to date, people re-
~iding on the old system, (1200) have paid ap·proximately 
$65,000.00 for sewer service. Five-sixth of this has gone 
to pay for the se,ver system in the new part of town. 
During the same period, residents in the new part 
of tow·n have paid nothing. 
Plaintiff concedes that the residents of the old part 
of to"~n should p·ay for the expense of operating the old 
system, (less than fifty cents per month) but contends 
they shoul·d not be required to pay for fu.e new system 
until (1) the old system is hooked onto the new disposal 
plant, and (2) residents in the new part of town pay at 
the same rate as those in the old part. As of now, resi-
dents in the old part of town are still being served by 
the old disposal plant. 
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In January 1961, Defendant began billing residents 
hooked onto the old systern $3.00 per 1nonth se\Yer 
charges, \Yhich \Yas included \vith their \Yater bill, and 
Defendant adopted a resolution, that if the se\Yer bill 
'vas not paid, Defendant could and \vould shut off the 
'Yater. 
Plaintiff received his bill in January and iinmedi-
ately notified Defendant in 'vriting that he did not intend 
paying the sewer charges in excess of actual expense for 
operation of the old system, and that in his opinion the 
charges were excessive, discriminatory and illegal. 
X o action 'vas taken by Defendant in response to 
this letter, and Defendant continued to bill Plaintiff for 
sewer service at the rate of $3.00 per month. Plaintiff 
has paid no sewer charges to date. 
On Nove1nber 27, 1961 Plaintiff received notice for 
the first tin1e, that unless the back sewer charges \Yere 
paid within ten days, his water \vould be shut off. 
On December 7, 1961, the present action \Yas filed. 
On a motion filed by Defendants for summary judg-
ment, heard by Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Judge Hanson 
on February 1, 1961, denied Defendants motion for sum-
mary judgment. 
The matter \vas extensively argued by Defendant on 
the basis of 17-6-3 :11, and particularly the following: 
''For a p·eriod of thirty ( 30) days after the 
date of such publication (rate resolution) any 
person in intere~t ~hall have the right to ron test 
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the legality of such resolution or proceedings or 
any bonds 'vhich may be authorized thereby or by 
the provi~ions made for the security and paYJnent 
of any such bonds, and after such time no one shall 
have any cause of action to contest the regularity, 
for1nality or legality thereof for any cause 'vhat-
soever." 
()n ~larch 28, 1961, the matter came before Judge 
Ray \r anCott, Jr., for pre-trial. Defendant again renewed 
his argument for summary judgment, using the identical 
argun1ent presented to Judge Ilanson. No new points 
"·ere presented. In spite of the prior adjudication of the 
issue by Judge Hanson, Judge \TanCott granted Defend-
anh; 1notion for summary judgment. No other matters 
\\·ere considered at the pre-trial. 
This appeal followed. 
ARGUMENT 
It is conceded by Plaintiff that if this Court sustains 
the position of Defendant, that he is precluded by failing 
to file his suit within the thirty day period from the 
adoption of the resolution, then of course the issue as to 
the fairness of the rate is moot. 
POINT 1. 
THE STATUTE IN QU'ESTION DID NO·T RELATE TO 
RATES, BUT TO BOND ISSUE. 
17-6-3 :10 and 17-6-3 :12 both relate to protecting the 
party buying the bonds. It is Plaintiff's contention that 
the thirty day limitation contained in 17-6-3 :11 relates 
to bond resolutions and not to rate resolutions. 
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The statute uses the "\vord ·•may'' as to publication of 
resolutions. Assurning that the word ''1nay" rnade it dis-
cretionary, and they did not publish the resolution as to 
rates. What happens then to the thirty day limitation? 
17-6-3 :2 through 17-6-3 :12 all relate to bond issuance. 
It seems only reasonable, the thirty day limitation should 
be restricted to resolutions as to bonds, and not rate 
charges. 
POINT 2. 
AT THE TIME THE RATE RESO·LUTION WAS ADOPT .. 
ED, D:E,C. 20, 1961, THE DEFENDANT DID NOT OWN THE 
OLD MAGNA S'EWER SYSTEM, AND THEREFOR THE 
RESOLUTION CO·ULD NOT APPLY. 
On December 20, 1961, the old ~Iagna sewer systen1 
'vas owned and operated by Salt Lake County. It is 
Plaintiff's position that Defendant could not adopt a 
resolution regulating the rates to he charged on a systen1 
they did not own. 
POINT 3. 
DEFENDANT BY ITS ·CONDUCT IS ESTOPPED FROM 
NOW RAISING THE THIRTY DAY LIMITATION STATUTE. 
E.,or the sake of argument, assuming the thirty day 
statute applied to the rate statute, it is Plaintiff's posi-
tion that the Defendant by its conduct is precluded fron1 
now relying on the same. 
When Plaintiff received his first bill for sewer 
charges in January, 1961, he notified Defendant by letter, 
January 30, 1961, that he objected to the charges. Other 
than billing Plaintiff each month along "ith his ":ater 
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bill, Defendant did nothing as to dernand, suit, or other 
action to enforce payrnent. It is Plaintiff's position that 
I>t~fendant lulled Plaintiff into a sense of security that 
precludes Defendant now from relying on the thirty day 
statute of limilations. 
POINT 4. 
PLAIN'TIFF COULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO CONTEST 
THE LEGALITY OF THE RATE RESOLUTION UNTIL HIS 
RIGHTS WERE JEOPARDIZED. 
lT p until Plaintiff received official notice that unless 
the se,ver assessments were paid, his water would be shut 
off, I)laintiff had the right to assume, after twelve months 
of no action by Defendant, that his position taken in the 
letter in January 1961 had been accepted, and no sewer 
charges \Yould be enforced till those residing in the new 
part of tow'n \vould also be assessed sewer charges, and 
until the ne\v disposal plant actually began serving Plain-
tiff and the old sewer system. 
Until such time as Plaintiff was actually injured, or 
given notice of impending injury (shutting off water) 
Plaintiff \Vould have no standing in Court. 
POINT 5. 
THE THIRTY DAY LIMITATION IS IN VIOLATION OF 
ARTICLE I, SECTIONS SEVEN AND ELEVEN OF THE 
STATE CONSTITUTION. 
On the "?ell established principal that in a summary 
judgment all allegations of Plaintiff are accepted as true, 
and further assmning that the rates are excessive, dis-
criminatory and illegal, then certainly the 2.50 per month 
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extra charge demanded by Defendant is taking property 
of Plaintiff, in violation of section seven of the state 
constitution. 
It is Plaintiff's position that the constitutionality of 
a issue cannot be precluded by a thirty day statute· of 
lin1itation; and that the the constitutional issue can be 
raised at any time. 
POINT 6. 
JUDGE VAN CO'TT EXCEEDED HIS AUTHORITY 
WHEN HE REVERSED THE PRIOR ADJUDICATION OF 
JUDGE HANSON ON THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
It is Plaintiff's position that Judge VanCott had no 
authority to act as a reviewing Court of a final adjudica-
tion made by Judge Hanson. Particularly in view of the 
fact that no new matters, either in la-\v or fact were pre-
sented to Judge \-r anCott that 'vere not presented to 
Judge Hanson. 
Plaintiff contends that Judge Hanson's ruling was a 
final adjudication as to the issue of summary judgment 
and the thirty day statute of limitation. That Plaintiff 
could rely on that issue having been deterinined, and that 
Defendant "Tas not entitled to a second chance, and in the 
event of trial a third chance, and on motion for new· trial a 
fourth chance. 
Defendants right to review 'vas to this Court, not to 
another Judge of the third Judicial District. 
Article 8 Section seven of the State constitution car-
ries no provision for one district Judge sitting as revie,v-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
1ng Court of another Di~trict J ndge; nor does 78-3 of 
the statutes carry any ~uch provision. 
On the other hand Article S, section 4 of the State 
Constitution provides that "·The Suprerne Court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction only." 
78-:2-2 of the statutes provide: 
''In other cases the Supreme Court shall have 
appellate jurisdiction only; and in the exercise 
of sueh appellate jurisdiction, may review final 
judgments of the district court, and all final orders 
and deerees of the district court . . . '' 
I havP been unable to find any power vested in one 
district court judge reviewing the final order of another 
district eourt judge. It is Plaintiff's p.osition, Judge 
I-fanson's ruling on the motion for summary judgment 
\Vas a final order. 
Defendant's recourse was that of appeal from that 
order to this Court, or presenting the issue to Judge 
Han~on for reconsideration. To hold otherwise would 
mean chaos in the third Judicial District where there 
are seven Judges ; if you don't like Judge H A'' ruling go 
to tTudges B-C-D-ete., till you find one who agrees with 
your position in the matter. 
The cases holding that a ruling on summary judg-
Inent is final adjudication are so numerous, Plaintiff feels 
~upport for this position by citing cases is not necessary. 
X o argument on the merit of Plaintiff's case is herein 
presented for the reason that neither Judge Hanson, nor 
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Judge \;ranCott considered that matter. Their hearing 
and ruling was exclusively on the motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
That the lower Court committed error in granting 
summary judgment for the reason the thirty day statute 
of liinitation did not apply to the issues herein involved; 
and if it did, Defendant is precluded from raising the 
same for the reason they did not 0\\"'11 the sewer system 
\Vhen the rate ruling was adopted; and by their conduct 
are estop.ped from raising the same. 
Further that Judge \Tan Cott's ruling \Vas ineffec-
tual for the reason the matter had been already deter-
mined by another Court, and Judge \ 1anCott was 'vithout 
authority to revie'v that decision. 
Respectfully submitted this fifth day of July, 1962. 
ROY F. TYGESEN 
Plaintiff .acthzg as his otcn 
Attorney 
2968 So. 8650 ''rest, Magna, Utah 
P.O. Box 206-Byron 7-6711 
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